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Introduction
The modern era of  globalisation has 
been associated with significant economic 
transformation around the world, but also 
an increasing frequency of  financial crises. 
According to Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) 
there were 39 national or international 
financial crises between 1945 and 1973. 
Their frequency increased to 139 between 
1973 and 1997, culminating in the Asian 
financial crisis. These crises occurred 
predominantly, but not exclusively, in 
emerging economies. 
Professor Bob Buckle is Pro Vice-Chancellor and Dean, Faculty of 
Commerce and Administration, Victoria University of Wellington. 
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Before and 
After the Global 
Financial Crisis 
The recent global financial crisis is unusual in a number 
of  important respects. It occurred after a period in which 
emerging-market-originated financial crises and risk levels 
seem to have declined substantially (Taylor, 2009, pp.38-9). 
Also, this crisis occurred after a period of  sustained high growth 
and lower income volatility and sustained low inflation (the 
‘great moderation’), at least for many developed economies. 
Moreover, the crisis was triggered not in an emerging economy 
but in the world’s largest and most advanced economy, the 
United States. 
The origins of  the global nature of  this crisis were not simply 
US policies. Global economic and financial relationships that 
evolved over the preceding decades were an important pre-
condition. What is more, the origins have an important Asia-
Pacific dimension. The crisis arose from a potent constellation 
of  events which included the growth strategies of  emerging 
economies in the Asia-Pacific region. These strategies led 
to global financial imbalances. These imbalances, when 
combined with the monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies 
in the United States, exposed the risks of  disintermediation, 
corporate governance practices and financial innovations, 
and contributed to a housing bubble. Given the magnitude 
of  the US economy and the seriousness of  the financial shock 
in the US, the crisis reverberated back across the region, and 
globally, with potentially important implications for the future 
Asia-Pacific growth process. 
Export-biased growth and convergence in Asia-Pacific
There are several parts to the process that precipitated the 
recent global financial crisis of  2008 and 2009. One important 
part was the process of  rapid economic growth centred on 
the Asian region, and in particular the importance of  export-
biased growth for China and other emerging economies in 
the region. 
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in China since 1978 and the 
liberalisation of  India’s economy after the crisis of  1971 
heralded a remarkable period of  growth in the Asia-Pacific 
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region and what could be described as the 
‘Third Industrial Revolution’. Together with 
the more recent emergence of  other Asia-
Pacific economies, such as Vietnam and 
Peru, and at earlier stages in the region of  
Korea, Singapore and Chile, for example, 
these economies have transformed global 
production chains and global financial 
linkages and have generated a wealth 
gain to the world. This wealth gain has 
been manifest in reductions in the real 
price of  consumption goods. It has also 
triggered significant terms of  trade gains for 
economies, such as Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada, supplying raw materials to these 
rapidly emerging economies. For the Asia-
Pacific region as a whole, this remarkable 
transformation resulted in the world’s centre 
of  gravity of  economic activity gradually 
shifting towards the region and income convergence in the 
region (see Buckle and Cruickshank, 2008). 
The process of  rapid economic growth in the more 
successful emerging economies was also characterised by a 
dependence on export-biased growth. There are a number 
of  reasons for this. On the one hand, financial market 
underdevelopment in emerging economies makes it more 
difficult for domestic savings generated by higher income 
growth to be recycled into the local economy. Furthermore, 
uncertainty with respect to the provision of  public goods 
or social security in public health systems and education 
systems can lead to precautionary saving and a higher rate 
of  saving overall and hence a lack of  domestic recycling 
of  the income growth, particularly if  financial markets are 
underdeveloped. 
Export-biased growth became a feature of  China’s 
growth process from the early 1990s after it became apparent 
that domestic demand was not growing fast enough to 
absorb the rapid investment-led growth in the production 
of  manufactured goods. While retaining investment-
driven growth, there was a switch towards exports and 
substitution of  domestic production for imports to absorb 
the rapid expansion in manufacturing capacity, particularly 
in the coastal and urban regions. China in fact became an 
integrator of  global and regional production networks, being 
a net importer from Japan, Korea, the ASEAN countries, 
Australia and India and a massive net exporter to the US and 
the European Union (Wong, 2007).
The disruption to growth and economic development 
caused by the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 also prompted 
a stronger emphasis on export-biased growth in the region. 
Following economic liberalisation, rapid economic growth in 
these Asian economies resulted in high growth in imports 
and increased dependence on foreign capital to finance their 
investment. For many Asian banks, borrowing was in foreign 
currency while lending was in their national currency. This 
meant they were exposed to the risk of  sharp changes in 
the exchange rate. When the crisis did 
occur, banks and corporations suffered 
severe financial losses. For example, the 
Indonesian rupiah lost 80% of  its value 
almost overnight. Bank and corporate 
foreign currency exposures led to severe 
losses. Indonesia’s GDP fell by 4% in the 
first year following the crisis, and it was 
some three years later before its GDP 
recovered to the pre-crisis level. South 
Korea recovered more quickly, as did 
Malaysia, but Thailand suffered a long 
period of  stagnation after the crisis. 
The public sectors in the crisis-
affected economies incurred significant 
fiscal costs to bail out their bankrupt 
financial systems. Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) estimate that for Indonesia the 
fiscal cost of  the Asian crisis was about 
55% of  its GDP. For Thailand the estimate was over 30%, 
for South Korea about 30% and for Malaysia about 17%.
Although one of  the consequences of  the Asian crisis 
was that financial systems improved, it also meant that many 
governments in the region became reluctant to allow their 
economies to run up current account deficits. There has 
been a fear of  exchange rate floating and a preference to 
maintain an undervalued exchange rate to support a strong 
current account position. The Chinese government certainly 
observed what happened to its neighbours in 1997/98 and 
concluded that it would not allow anything similar to happen 
in China. 
The Asian financial crisis set the scene for the emphasis 
in subsequent years on export-biased growth in China and 
other emerging economies in the region. China’s export 
development model was underpinned by pegging its 
currency to the United States dollar at an undervalued rate 
in order to generate trade surpluses and accumulate foreign 
reserves. In order to give effect to this process, the monetary 
authority in China has had to sterilise the potential effects 
on the domestic money supply by issuing government bonds 
and by increasing the reserve requirements of  its financial 
institutions. 
Another lesson of  the Asian financial crisis was to ensure 
robust financial institutions and systems. While this has 
helped the emerging Asian economies to weather the current 
crisis, ironically the development of  production and financial 
linkages that have aided growth and convergence in the 
upswing years, and the dependence on export demand, have 
also played a significant part in exposing these economies 
to the contagion effects of  the current crisis. What was an 
advantage in the period leading up to the recent crisis has 
been exposed as a weakness in this crisis.
Global imbalances (or ‘Bretton Woods II’)
The emphasis on export-biased growth, growing current 
account surpluses and increasing foreign reserves in the 
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Asian region, particularly in China, was an important 
ingredient in the emergence of  global imbalances, a savings 
glut and excess liquidity during the lead-up to the current 
financial crisis. High domestic saving and large current 
account surpluses had been particularly evident in China. 
While Chinese households tended to save at a very high rate, 
a rise in Chinese corporate savings, including saving by state-
owned enterprises, has been at the core of  the rapid rise in 
China’s savings (see Wolf, 2009). The government itself  has 
also been a large saver. For similar reasons, the surge in oil 
prices and oil revenues for oil exporting countries added to 
the glut of  savings in these economies.
The consequential current account surpluses of  China, 
other Asian economies and oil exporting economies were 
recycled to enable persistent current account deficit economies 
such as the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, and 
the smaller developed Asia-Pacific countries of  Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand to consume and invest far more 
than their domestic income would otherwise enable. As Hunt 
(2008) has pointed out, prior to the current crisis there had 
been a rapid growth in savings in emerging Asia compared to 
the recovery of  investment in this region. In contrast, there 
had been a secular decline in the investment rates and an 
even larger fall in savings rates in advanced economies (see 
Figure 1), a process made possible by the recycling of  savings 
in the former group to finance the dissaving of  the latter 
group.
The IMF (2005) attributes the decline in advanced 
economy saving rates to increased access to credit facilitated 
by various financial market innovations, a decline in public 
saving in some advanced economies such as the United 
States, and an increase in elderly dependency rates in 
economies such as Japan. The IMF considers that declining 
investment rates, particularly in Europe and Japan, are due 
to demographic trends and reduced investment requirements 
for industrial economies as a whole. But the key point is 
that despite stronger investment growth in the emerging 
economies, saving rates increased even further and despite 
a secular decline in investment rates in advanced economies, 
saving rates there declined even further. These differences 
were manifest in balance of  payments current account 
balances (see Figure 2). The distribution of  these balances 
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Figure 1: Savings and investment: 
developing Asia and advanced economies
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is reflective of  the important financial 
relationships that emerged, particularly 
between the world’s largest (and highest 
income) economy, the United States, and 
many emerging economies, and notably 
China. 
The co-dependence between the 
respective saving rates, current account 
balances and corresponding financial 
capital flows has been termed by 
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 
(2004a, 2004b) ‘Bretton Woods II’, in 
acknowledgement of  the similarity to 
the type of  financial arrangements that 
evolved under Bretton Woods institutions 
during the postwar years. Under Bretton 
Woods the reserve currency was also the 
US dollar. In that era, savings in Japan 
and Europe supported the US dollar 
and funded the US current account 
deficit that was being used to finance US consumption and 
investment growth, and eventually the war in Vietnam. The 
system ended in 1971 when US-dollar convertibility into 
gold was suspended, the US dollar was floated and other 
countries broke from pegging their currencies to it.2
Current account imbalances and the corresponding flows 
of  financial capital can be an important means by which 
resources in net saving economies are lent to countries that 
are dissaving. Provided relative prices are able to adjust 
appropriately, this process can lead to a more efficient 
global allocation of  savings and investment. Sometimes 
the unwinding of  these ‘imbalances’ is painless, especially 
when the investment consequent on these transfers generates 
revenue to warrant the earlier borrowing or dissaving. At 
other times they can be a painful process, particularly when 
speculative attacks result in exchange rate adjustments 
that significantly increase the cost of  debt to the borrower 
countries, as occurred during the Tequila crisis of  the mid-
1990s and the Asian financial crisis of  1997/98.
 The global financial imbalances of  the new millennium 
were, however, rather different from past experiences. 
The direction, at least in net terms, of  the capital flows 
was predominantly from emerging markets to developed 
economies. Moreover, these flows were dominated by the 
relationship between China and the US, where China in effect 
became the banker for the United States. In other words, 
in Bretton Woods II, the US was the principal destination 
for this glut of  savings in the emerging economies, and the 
level of  savings in China in particular was the largest source 
of  savings. According to Wolf  (2008), the US was absorbing 
about 70% of  the surplus savings in the rest of  the world. 
Governments in emerging economies were directly 
responsible for much of  the recycling in the form of  capital 
outflows from those economies. This has occurred either 
because domestic residents were not able to hold foreign 
assets, as in China, or because most of  the export revenue 
accrued to governments, as in many of  
the oil exporting economies. Hence there 
emerged large sovereign wealth funds. 
The implication for exchange rates was 
significant. One of  the reasons for such 
large current account surpluses for emerging 
economies was the management of  
exchange rates in order to maintain export 
competitiveness. The surpluses were used 
to purchase United States assets, thereby 
assisting to maintain demand for and the 
value of  the US dollar, preventing it falling 
against their own currencies. This process 
has been described as ‘vendor financing’, in 
recognition of  the fact that countries with 
large volumes of  exports to sell have been 
financing their biggest market. 
A key feature of  this process was that, 
in contrast to borrowing by emerging 
economies, because it is the issuer of  an 
international reserve currency the US has been able to incur 
debt denominated in its own currency. This significantly 
changes the distribution of  risk compared to when emerging 
economies were borrowers leading up to the Asian and 
Tequila crises, for example. The distribution of  risk is relevant 
when we consider the potential implications for emerging 
Asia-Pacific economic relationships and growth in the post-
crisis period.
All else being equal, an excess of  investment over savings, 
as has occurred in the US and other advanced economies, 
should lead to an increase in long-term interest rates in 
those economies. However, the Bretton Woods II process of  
intermediation had the effect of  providing easy credit and 
depressing United States and global long-term interest rates 
(see Figure 3).
The process of  global imbalances and global 
intermediation had another important effect. By recycling 
savings to purchase US financial assets and supporting the 
US dollar, the resulting elevated real exchange rate for US 
tradable goods and services disadvantaged producers in that 
sector, causing it to shrink (as manifest in the current account 
deficit). The reason this didn’t result in a much earlier 
recession in the US is that, in contrast to the household 
sector in China, the household sector in the US was dissaving 
and maintaining high rates of  demand for non-traded 
goods, particularly high rates of  residential investment. An 
expansionary US fiscal policy was another important factor 
sustaining US non-tradable demand. 
United States policy: triggering and prolonging the crisis
Politicising the housing market
Prior to the outbreak of  the current crisis, property price 
booms had been spreading across several economies. In 2006 
nominal house price inflation exceeded 10% in eight out of  
18 OECD economies. This boom was particularly evident 
in, but not restricted to, Anglosphere countries (the US, UK, 
Prior to the outbreak 
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New Zealand, Ireland, Canada, Australia), described by 
Ferguson (2008) as the first property-owning democracies. 
For the United States, the basis of  this property-owning 
democracy was developed particularly during the latter part 
of  the Great Depression. The New Deal introduced many of  
the institutional features of  current US housing policy which 
have underpinned the US housing market. Indeed, Ferguson 
suggests that the most successful and enduring component 
of  the New Deal was how it transformed the US housing 
market. 
During the Depression, US mortgages were typically 
short-term, and were not amortised. The establishment of  the 
Federal Housing Administration provided federally-backed 
insurance for mortgage lenders, and encouraged large, long-
term, fully amortised low-interest loans (Ferguson, 2008). The 
foundation for a national secondary market was established 
with the introduction of  the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (‘Fannie Mae’), authorised to issue bonds and use 
the proceeds to buy mortgages from local Savings and Loans 
associations (S&L). S&Ls became the foundation for growing 
property ownership in the post-Depression years.3
From the 1930s onwards the US government was 
effectively underwriting the mortgage market (Ferguson, 
2008). Before the 1930s about 40% of  American homeowners 
were owner-occupiers. Today that figure is close to 70% (as it 
is in other parts of  the Anglosphere). 
This structure came under threat in the late 1970s and 
1980s when, in the wake of  Paul Volcker’s higher interest 
rate anti-inflation strategy, less regulated financial institutions 
were able to compete more effectively for deposits. To 
restore the position of  Savings and Loans associations, the 
Carter and Reagan administrations provided tax breaks 
and deregulation (see Ferguson, 2008, p.254). The crisis 
resulting from the mismatching of  assets and liabilities, and 
fraudulent practices, was a clear lesson in the consequences 
of  well-intentioned but poorly designed regulation. It did 
not have the global implications of  the current crisis, but it 
provided the opportunity for investment banks and the less 
regulated financial sector to establish a stronger presence in 
the mortgage market and to develop financial instruments 
such as mortgage-backed securities.4 Moreover, the majority 
of  mortgages still qualified for an implicit guarantee from 
the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) ‘Fannie Mae’, 
‘Freddie Mac’, and ‘Ginnie Mae’. 5 
Politicisation of  the housing market continued under 
the Bush administration, as highlighted by President Bush 
in December 2003 when he remarked: ‘it is in our national 
interest that more people own their home’ (cited in Ferguson, 
2008, p.267). The combination of  declining real interest 
rates, political support and financial innovations appeared 
to have markedly boosted home ownership. In the ten years 
from 1995 to 2005, home ownership increased from 64% to 
around 70%. Ferguson (2008) suggests that half  of  that can 
be attributed to the sub-prime lending boom. 
The sub-prime crisis
The history of  financial crises suggests that financial 
deregulation tends to be followed by financial innovations. 
These innovations can lead inadvertently to higher risk 
which raises the probability of  financial failure. In recent 
years, many countries have abolished regulations limiting 
the range of  activities in which their banks can engage. One 
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explanation for these regulatory reforms 
is that this enables greater diversification 
of  assets and liabilities needed to 
withstand shocks (Adalet, 2007). In 
the US, the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) 
restricting commercial bank involvement 
in investment banking was abolished 
in 1999. This removed restrictions on 
mixing commercial and investment 
banking, and it allowed commercial 
banks, and insurance companies like 
AIG, to encroach on the traditional 
investment banking services. 
Eichengreen (2008) observes that 
while this was basically sensible policy, 
based on a model that had proved viable 
in Germany and other parts of  Europe, 
in the US financial environment it 
had serious unintended consequences. 
Investment banks were forced to develop 
new lines of  business to sustain their profitability. It created 
an environment that prompted the originate-and-distribute 
model of  securitisation, the extensive use of  leverage and the 
growth of  the sub-prime mortgage market.6
The sub-prime model relied on low interest rates, rising 
real estate prices and mortgagees maintaining their ability 
to service the mortgages. Taylor (2009) suggests there is a 
dynamic interaction that tends to accentuate risk-taking. 
When house-price inflation is high there is a tendency for 
housing foreclosure and delinquency rates on adjustable-rate 
sub-prime mortgages to fall. This probably reflects the benefits 
of  holding onto a house and working longer hours to meet the 
mortgage payments when house prices are rising rapidly. The 
declining rates of  foreclosure and delinquency that occurred 
in the US during the early part of  the millennium may have 
confused many, including rating agencies, as to the true extent 
of  risk. This problem would have been accentuated by the 
complex securitisation techniques that evolved during this 
period and led to what Taylor has described as the ‘Queen of  
Spades problem’ – where people don’t know which securities 
had the bad mortgages in them.
Repackaged as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) 
and with the assistance of  favourable credit ratings, these 
sub-prime securities were transformed from risky loans into 
highly-rated investment-grade securities. The risk was spread 
across the globe to institutions seeking what were thought 
to be secure returns for pension funds, insurance funds, etc. 
However, the process accentuated the information asymmetry 
risks. Ferguson nicely captures the information risks:
Those who knew best the flakiness of  sub-prime loans – 
the people who dealt directly with the borrowers and knew 
their economic circumstances – bore the least risk. They 
could make a 100% loan-to-value ‘NINJA’ loan (to someone 
with no income, no job, or assets) and sell it on the same day 
to one of  the big banks in the CDO business. In no time at all 
the risk was floating up a fjord (Ferguson, 2008, p.269) 
‘Light touch’ regulation in the US 
(and in the UK and parts of  Europe), 
fragmented regulatory systems and failures 
of  supervision are therefore considered 
by some to have played an important part 
in enabling the development of  markets 
for CDOs and the global spread of  these 
securities (see the discussion in Henderson, 
2009). This process of  globalising the risk 
exposed not just the US financial system but 
many parts of  the global financial system to 
greater risk of  contagion. When the Federal 
Reserve did start to raise interest rates from 
late 2004 through to 2006, huge numbers 
of  sub-prime mortgage holders were not 
able to service the renewed higher mortgage 
interest rates, causing foreclosures which 
burst the real estate bubble. From 2006, US 
house prices started to fall for the first time 
since the early 1990s, and housing starts 
dropped like a stone. By 2007 the collapse of  the US sub-
prime mortgage market was reverberating across the United 
States and global financial markets. 
US monetary policy: too late and off target?
The role of  the US Federal Reserve and monetary policy 
is still hotly debated. During the early part of  the new 
millennium, the Federal Reserve decisions were primarily 
concerned with the sharp slump in GDP growth, following 
the collapse of  the dot.com bubble, a fear of  the deflation 
that had plagued Japan in the 1990s and the impact of  9/11. 
To boost demand, the Federal Reserve quickly lowered the 
federal funds rate from around 6.5% to below 2% in late 
2001. The rate was then gradually reduced to 1% and held 
there until early 2004. 
Taylor (2009) is of  the view that the Federal Reserve 
allowed this loose monetary policy to go on for too long. 
His argument is based on a comparison of  Federal Reserve 
funds rate decisions from 2002 to 2006 with federal funds 
rate decisions that would have been made had the Federal 
Reserve followed the same decision-making rule used 
during the period of  ‘great moderation’. He argues that 
Federal Reserve interest rates in the period 2001–2004 
represented an unusually large discretionary deviation from 
the usual decision rule. They fell well below what historical 
experience suggested the policy response should have been, 
and accentuated the US housing boom. This sharp easing in 
monetary policy contributed to the subsequent upswing in 
the business cycle and inflation, and therefore the eventual 
decision to lift interest rates sharply again from 2005 to 2006, 
decisions that were more in line with early monetary policy. 
While the period of  low interest rates helped fuel the sub-
prime mortgage market, the sudden reversal of  interest rates 
contributed to the collapse of  that market.
If  this argument is correct, then the break in interest rate 
policy may not have been restricted to the United States Federal 
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Reserve alone. Ahrend, Cournède and 
Price (2008) argue that deviations from 
the ‘Taylor rule’ by central banks in 
several other countries contributed 
significantly to the housing booms in 
those countries. They demonstrate that 
countries with the largest interest rate 
deviations below what previous policy 
rules would have predicted experienced 
the biggest housing investment booms. 
On the other hand, some consider it 
not credible to blame all the US excesses 
of  recent years on US monetary policy 
(see, for example, Ferguson, 2008, p.267). 
Dunaway (2009) considers that because 
the yield curve in the US was relatively 
flat in the early part of  the decade in 
response to the global ‘savings glut’, 
Federal Reserve increases in short-term 
rates may not have fully passed through 
into long-term rates.
It is difficult to identify the relevant 
weights we should attach to central bank interest rate 
decisions and the glut of  savings from emerging economies 
in contributing to the global decline in real interest rates and 
the housing boom. What is clear is that this was a global 
phenomenon. The global connections could be explained 
by national monetary policies reacting to potential exchange 
rate appreciations that could have been prompted either by 
the glut of  savings in emerging economies lowering global 
long-term real interest rates, or in response to the US Federal 
Reserve decisions to lower interest rates. Under either 
argument, central banks around the OECD economies would 
be observed to be simultaneously lowering short-term interest 
rates. These two arguments seem to be observationally 
equivalent. 
Did US policy prolong the crisis?
Many have suggested the crisis can be dated from June 2007, 
when two hedge funds owned by Bear Stearns were revealed 
by Merrill Lynch to be insolvent. Bear Stearns bailed out one 
fund but let the other collapse. Rating agencies subsequently 
began downgrading residential mortgage-based CDOs and 
by the end of  2007, American Home Mortgage had filed for 
bankruptcy, mortgage investment funds were being suspended, 
Northern Rock was nationalised by the government in the 
UK, numerous hedge funds were wound up, and asset write-
downs by banks eliminated hundreds of  billions of  US dollars 
from their balance sheets. What is more, the government-
sponsored Fannie Mae (which under encouragement of  
government policy had significantly increased its share of  US 
mortgages) was placed in serious risk of  collapse. 
US policy makers have also been criticised for prolonging 
the crisis. The US Treasury and Federal Reserve initially 
interpreted the crisis as if  it was a liquidity problem. The 
Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the 2008 Economic 
Stimulus Package, and even the initial cuts in 
the Federal funds rate in the early part of  the 
millennium (which contributed to a lower 
exchange rate and higher oil prices in US 
dollars) were focused on improving liquidity. 
However, Taylor and Williams (2009) argue 
that the principal underlying problem was 
one of  ‘counterparty risk’.7
The decline in house prices, reduced job 
security for homeowners and higher risk 
of  bankruptcy are likely to have increased 
the risk of  deterioration in bank balance 
sheets, causing greater concern about 
counterparty risk. Banks were criticised for 
not lending to traders or being reluctant to 
lend to each other. This has commonly been 
interpreted as a liquidity problem, whereas 
in fact the underlying problem may have 
been that banks were more concerned with 
counterparty risk. 
The Taylor and Williams critique, and 
criticism by others such as Anna Schwartz 
(2008), implies that there was in the US, and possibly elsewhere, 
an initial diagnosis error by policy institutions, and implies 
that policy errors by policy makers not only sparked the crisis 
but may also have prolonged it. In any event, perceived risk 
levels seem to have declined following the implementation of  
the Troubled Assets Relief  Programme and the introduction 
of  guarantees by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Federal Reserve support for the Commercial Bills Market and 
similar actions in other countries. 
Prognosis and implications for Asia-Pacific growth
The IMF has described the current global situation as the 
outcome of  ‘the largest financial shock since the Great 
Depression’ (IMF, 2009a). The collapse of  the US housing 
and sub-prime lending markets, and the spread of  toxicated 
assets across the financial centres of  Europe, had such a 
powerful domino effect that what started as a financial shock 
turned into a global production slump. In October 2009 the 
IMF forecast an annual decline in global GDP in 2009 of  
1.1% (IMF, 2009b). This compares to growth of  3% in 2008 
and 5.2% in 2007, and represents a negative turnaround of  
over 6% growth in two years! (see Figure 4). If  this proves 
correct, it will be the first annual fall in world GDP in the 
postwar era. 
These forecasts reflect a feature of  this global recession 
that Bollard and Ng (2009) consider distinguishes it from 
previous global recessions of  the postwar era. The financial 
crisis spread quickly from the US to Europe, reflecting the 
direct vulnerability of  Europe’s financial sector to the US-
originated credit exposures, as well as the adverse relaxation 
of  credit standards within Europe itself. The eventual spread 
to emerging economies, including China and many other 
parts of  the Asia-Pacific region, has been primarily through 
trade and commodity price channels. The financial shock 
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had an adverse impact on confidence and wealth in advanced 
economies, causing a slump in consumer and investment 
demand, thereby transmitting the shock to the traded-goods 
sectors and to commodity prices via the traditional channels. 
The IMF expects the volume of  world trade to fall by 11.9% 
in 2009 and commodity prices to fall by 30.6% for oil and 
20.3% for non-oil commodities.
This unusual characteristic is reflected in the IMF forecasts, 
which are for advanced economy GDP to fall by 3.4% this 
year, a growth reversal of  6.1% in two years. Emerging and 
developing economy GDP growth is expected to grow by only 
1.7%, a growth reversal as severe as for developed economies. 
China and India are expected to be more resilient and grow 
by 8.5% and 5.4% respectively in 2009, but this is still below 
growth in the previous two years. 
How will this crisis and the ensuing global recession 
influence the Asia-Pacific growth process in the future? The 
global financial crisis has exposed the weaknesses of  the pre-
crisis model of  export-biased growth dependent on US and 
EU domestic demand growth. What had been an advantage 
for emerging economies under Bretton Woods II prior to the 
crisis has proved to be a weakness during the crisis. 
While the lessons of  the Asian financial crisis were 
absorbed and have been applied to improve the resilience 
of  financial markets in the Asian region, the effects of  the 
current crisis are particularly apparent in the collapse of  
exports in the region. The inevitable slump in China’s exports 
has been accompanied by a decline in China’s import growth 
and hence its demand for output from other Asian economies. 
Cyclically sensitive high-tech manufacturing exports were hit 
particularly hard and Asian manufacturing exports were more 
severely affected than during the dot.com crash and the late 
1990s Asian financial crisis (IMF, 2009a). This was particularly 
the case in Thailand, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia 
and Japan (Figure 5). Asia’s tightly integrated supply chain, 
a feature that promoted high growth during the preceding 
decade, propagated the effect of  the US and European slump 
across the region.
Furthermore, the risks to emerging economies of  the 
Bretton Woods II model of  ‘vendor financing’ have also been 
exposed. Foreign central banks, like China’s, and sovereign 
wealth funds that have invested in US Treasury and other 
–30–6
–5
–4
–3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
–25
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
Malaysia
Emerging economies
Advanced economies
World
Korea
Singapore
Thailand
Japan
5
10
2
0
0
0
2
0
01
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
07
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
01
0
A
nn
ua
l %
 g
ro
w
th
2
0
0
8
Q
4
 G
D
P
 g
ro
w
th
 (S
A
A
R
)
Share of advanced manufacturing in GDP
Source: International Monetary Fund (2009), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/c1/fig1_pdf) Source: International Monetary Fund (2009a)
Figure 4: Global economic growth and IMF forecasts Figure 5: Asian high-tech manufacturing exports
Page 44 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 5, Issue 4 – November 2009
agency securities and which have financed 
the large US current account deficits of  
recent years, have suffered immense capital 
losses. Moreover, because these investments 
are typically denominated in US dollars, the 
reserve currency, they are highly exposed to 
exchange rate risk. Foreign central banks and 
sovereign wealth funds holding US dollar-
denominated assets remain vulnerable to a 
fall in the value of  the US dollar should the 
Bretton Woods II model not be sustainable.8
An alternative future growth scenario 
is one in which saving rates in developed 
economies increase or growth continues 
to stagnate, and there is a shift away from 
the heavy reliance on export-biased growth 
by China and emerging economies and a 
greater reliance on domestic demand to sustain production. 
Declines in house prices and financial wealth have affected 
consumption spending in the US as households attempt to 
rebuild wealth. US household saving is rising and is expected 
to continue to rise above its current level (Dunaway, 2009). 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of  the Federal government 
fiscal expansion plans has been hindered by concerns at 
the prospect of  an emerging fiscal crisis in the US and by 
attempts by many state governments to restore their fiscal 
balances. The US Federal fiscal deficit is expected to be 
5.5% of  GDP by 2019, and national debt accumulate to the 
levels immediately after World War Two when the US was 
paying off  war debts (Auerbach and Gale, 2009). At some 
point US government saving will also have to rise. Europe 
and Japan also seem unlikely to provide an alternative source 
of  demand recovery. There seems little scope for fiscal and 
consumption-based growth in Japan, which seems likely to 
remain dependent on export demand, particularly from 
China.
Attention therefore inevitably turns to Asia, and in 
particular whether China will be able to rely more on domestic 
demand as the engine of  growth. Many commentators have 
noted the sectoral and geographical imbalances and the 
income inequality and rural discontent that China’s growth 
process has to date created. The Chinese leadership had 
been aware of  the need for change even before the global 
financial crisis. At the fifth Party Plenum in October 2005 
the 11th Five-Year Plan was adopted, calling for a redirection 
of  China’s growth strategy, one that is more broad-based 
and more balanced and sustainable (Wong, 2007). The 
global situation since the financial crisis has provided further 
impetus for change in China. China has started to move 
more strongly in this direction by instructing state-owned 
enterprises to invest reserves in domestic infrastructure and 
to maintain employment and boost domestic spending. It is 
also converting its huge stock of  foreign reserves into claims 
on resources around the world. But China still faces a difficult 
transition, that will require financial reforms (to improve 
the intermediation of  savings) and the removal of  price 
distortions (including the low cost of  
capital and undervalued exchange rate) 
that have underpinned the investment 
and export-biased growth process of  
the previous stage of  its development. 
It seems unlikely therefore that the 
Asia-Pacific growth model based on 
export-biased growth from emerging 
economies and vendor financing of  
imports by developed economies (the 
US in particular) will be sustained in the 
post-crisis era. If  advanced economies 
start to save more as households start to 
restore housing equity and governments 
start to tackle the fiscal deficits that have 
rapidly emerged from the crisis, external 
deficits in developed economies will 
start to decline in the post-crisis era. Higher saving rates by 
advanced economies will impact on the export and foreign 
investment environment for emerging economies. 
If  saving rates do rise in advanced economies, sustained 
growth convergence that has characterised the Asia-Pacific 
region during the past two decades will require lower saving 
rates in emerging economies and a greater dependence on 
domestic demand to restore their relatively high growth rates. 
But a new model based on stronger domestic demand growth 
in emerging economies will require sectoral rebalancing, 
and structural and real exchange rate changes that enable 
these economies to attract a greater share of  domestic and 
advanced economy savings. The transition to this new model 
will take time and may result in slower Asia-Pacific and global 
growth in the immediate future, but it may also provide a 
more robust basis for sustained growth and reduced risk of  
financial crises.
Conclusion
The recent financial crisis resulted from the conjuncture of  
events that included growth strategies and exchange rate 
policies in emerging economies, investment decisions of  
central banks in these emerging economies, including oil 
exporting economies, the financial innovations that were 
spurred by US regulatory changes, and corporate governance 
practices. Previous postwar financial crises in the US, such as 
the Savings and Loans crisis, did not have the same global 
impact that the recent crisis had. The conjuncture of  US 
and European financial practices and emerging economy 
growth strategies propelled the collapse of  the US sub-prime 
mortgage market into the worst global financial shock and 
recession of  the postwar era. 
The crisis exposed the risks of  global imbalances (or Bretton 
Woods II) of  the last two decades, and the vulnerability this 
process presents for emerging economies striving to ‘catch 
up’. The risks of  the model of  export-biased growth were 
exposed. If  the Asia-Pacific region is to restore its position 
as the engine of  global growth, if  emerging economies are 
to retain the impressive rates of  growth and convergence of  
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the last two decades, a new growth model will be needed, one 
more dependent on domestic demand growth and recycling 
of  saving towards, rather than away from, those economies. 
The implications for developed economies on the periphery, 
such as New Zealand and Australia, will be important. The 
success of  the growth transition in China, and other emerging 
economies in the region such as Vietnam, will have an even 
more important impact on commodity prices and on the 
opportunities to exploit these growing markets, particularly 
if  the US economy fails to recover to the growth rates of  the 
pre-crisis era. Similarly, the diversification of  Asian saving 
away from the US market could have a significant impact 
on exchange rates in these countries, particularly if  China 
continues to manage its exchange rate. The global financial 
crisis may not necessarily be epoch-defining, but it seems 
certain to provoke a significant change in Asia-Pacific growth 
dynamics. 
 1 This article is a revised version of presentations to the ‘World Class Practices in 
Management Education’ conference at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, 31 May–2 June 
2009; Victoria University of Wellington MBA 25 years celebrations, http://www.victoria.
ac.nz/vms/study/postgraduate/mba/25thCelebrations.aspx; and the Lee Foundation 
Lecture, University of Economics, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, 29 August 2009. I am grateful 
to Muge Adalet, Alan Bollard, Amy Cruickshank, Gary Hawke and John McDermott for their 
helpful conversations and suggestions during preparation for these various presentations, 
and to Jonathan Boston for editing suggestions. 
2 There have been other periods when global savings flowed from one region to another. An 
example is the pre-World War One gold standard period, when the industrial economies of 
Britain, France and Germany financed the development of resource-intensive regions such 
as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and some of the southern-cone economies of South 
America. 
3 The New Deal also introduced federal deposit insurance, while mortgage interest payments 
had been tax deductible since the inception of the federal income tax in 1913. 
4 In 1980 only 10% of the US home mortgage market had been securitised, but by 2007 this 
proportion had risen to 57% (Ferguson, 2008, p.260).
5 In 1968 the operations of Fannie Mae were split in two: the Government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae), catering to poor borrowers, and a re-chartered Fannie Mae 
established as a privately-owned government-sponsored enterprise (GSE). Two years later, 
to provide some competition in the secondary market, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (Freddie Mac) was established. The effect was to again broaden the secondary 
market for mortgages and, in principle, provide lower mortgage rates.
6 Henderson (2009) provides an excellent description of the ‘originate-and-distribute’ model 
of housing finance and the information asymmetries that emerge by breaking the process 
into five critical links: the originator, the packager, the rating agency, the repackager and the 
credit insurer.
7 Counterparty risk is a situation in which banks become reluctant to lend to each other 
because of the perception that the risk of default on loans has increased and the market 
price of taking on such risk has risen. This situation requires a focus on the quality and 
transparency of bank balance sheets.
8 Concerns about the sustainability of the Bretton Woods II model and emerging economy 
vulnerabilities prompted calls to boost resources for international financial institutions. The 
G20 leaders, for example, agreed at a meeting in London in March this year to strengthen 
financial supervision and regulation and make an additional US$850 billion in resources 
through international financial institutions such as the IMF (including a boost to SDR 
allocation), World Bank and other multilateral development banks, and to speed up reform 
of these institutions to ensure national representation is more in line with the changing 
global economic balance. 
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